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OF TIME AND ETERNITY IN KIERKEGAARD'S 
CONCEPT OF ANXIETY 
Louis Dupre 
I. Schelling's Impact 
In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard first sketched the principles of a religi-
ous anthropology which he developed more systematically in The Sickness Unto 
Death, his other "psychological" study. The earlier work remains important for 
several reasons. It introduces a new method of theological reflection and provides 
one of the principal categories through which our own epoch has come to under-
stand itself. But its most significant contribution doubtlessly lies in a theory of the 
self as a self-realizing yet dependent synthesis. In the following essay I shall 
analyze the crucial element of this anthropological synthesis: the relation between 
the eternal and the temporal. 
So then man was said to be a synthesis of soul and body; but he is at the 
same time a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. I have no objection 
to recognizing that this has often been said; I have no wish to discover 
novelties, but rather it is my joy and my darling occupation to think upon 
things which seem perfectly simple. (CD 76; VI, 173) 
The somewhat polemical tone of this passage as well as the comparison with ear-
lier theories, the denseness of the text itself, here and in the corresponding descrip-
tion in The Sickness Unto Death, strongly suggest the impact of other theories. 
Kierkegaard felt, of course, no compunction about borrowing from others, nor did 
he attempt to hide his sources. In The Concept of Anxiety overt references abound. 
Yet none support his central definition of the self. This absence should alert us to 
the probability of interpretative problems. If Kierkegaard fails to name his pre-
decessors while generally admitting their existence, his reason for doing so must 
be either that he has fundamentally transformed the original theories or that he has 
so thoroughly assimilated what he borrowed as to consider it his own. In either 
case the text invites a critical comparison with earlier theories. 
I have no doubt that Kierkegaard' s principal source for his dynamic theory of the 
self is Schelling's Philosophical Investigations on the Essence of Human Freedom 
(1809). In this work, interesting in its own right (Heideggerdevoted a series oflec-
tures to it in 1936), Schelling reformulated the problem of freedom in a manner 
that has remained influential unto our own day. From Descartes to Kant the ques-
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tion of physical determinism had dominated the discussion of freedom. In Schel-
ling's panentheistic perspective its integration with an absolute totality became the 
critical issue. How can a free agent remain autonomous while being a part of a 
wider absolute? Kant had skirted the problem when he considered (and dismissed) 
the possibility of a moral theonomy. His primary concern had remained with the 
possibility of free actions in a physically determined universe. For Schelling the 
more important question was the relation of freedom to a transcendent absolute. In 
modem terms: How can the pre-existence of given ideals fail to jeopardize moral 
autonomy? Authentic freedom tolerates no predetermined order of values or 
ideals. In his answer also Schelling anticipates modem solutions. God does not 
predetermine freedom, but, rather, is the very source of man's self-determining 
activity. Hence, a dependence on the absolute lies at the very roots of moral au-
tonomy. To render this solution acceptable Schelling first had to neutralize the fear 
of pantheism which had led to the unbridgeable chasm between the Absolute and 
the finite free agent. The agent does not relate to God as he relates to the physical 
world. His activity must at some point coincide with a divine creativity on which it 
intrinsically depends. Man is most intimately united with God when he is free. Op-
position begins where freedom ends. 
But how can such a God-like freedom include a capacity of evil? To solve this 
formidable problem Schelling distinguishes the Ground of God's existence from 
that existence itself. This "Nature-in-God", as he calls it, remains, of course, in-
separable from God's Being, yet since it does not coincide with that Being, it is not 
God, but rather the Ground from which God himself as well as all creation 
emerges. Man as the only creature to rise from this dark Ground to the full clarity 
of a spiritual existence displays a unique resemblance with God, a resemblance 
which in fact rests upon a partial identity. Only in him is the Word fully spoken and 
does spirit become manifest. Still while attaining individual form in the clarity of 
spirit man also remains attached to the indeterminate Ground from which he 
emerges. In God nature and spirit are indissolubly united. In man their bond re-
mains fragile, ever to be strengthened anew. Being endowed with spirit, he is not 
simply spirit. At any time he may disturb the delicate balance between spiritual 
selfhood and dark nature. Neglecting one or the other he separates his particular 
will from the divine Will. Schelling's interpretation of moral evil is at once dualis-
tic (in God) and qualifiedly monist (in man). 
In his discussion of original sin Kierkegaard takes his distance from both. His 
more traditional approach has no use for such unorthodox distinctions as the one 
between spirit and nature in God. Nonetheless on a human level he also interprets 
sinfulness as a removal from "spirit", a regression to a more "natural" synthesis of 
soul and body. For him the conscious acceptance of the primordial dependence in-
troduces an eternal element into man's being and constitutes it into a spiritual self. 
Here especially we detect traces of Schelling's influence. For the German idealist 
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the spiritual origin of freedom lies, outside the succession of time, in a primary act 
that determines all time-and-space conditioned activity. In Schelling's own words: 
The act whereby life in time is determined belongs itself not to time but to 
eternity. It does not precede life even with respect to time, but goes 
through time (without being grasped by it) as a by nature eternal deed. 
Through it human life reaches up to the origin of creation, because 
through it man is, outside the realm of creation, free and of eternal origin. 
However incomprehensible this idea may appear to common thinking, 
there nevertheless corresponds in each person a feeling to it, as if he had 
been from all eternity what he is, rather than having become so in time. I 
Man is constituted as act and as will in his timeless origin and this aboriginal being-
act conditions all his activity in time. The impact of this theory upon Schopenhauer 
and, through him, upon Nietzsche is evident But it also profoundly affected Kier-
kegaard's concept of the self as will. Beginning with Either/Or he consistently de-
scribes genuine selfhood as a choice. The self posits itself by choosing itself. 
Hence freedom constitutes man's very essence. 
I posit the absolute, for I myself am the absolute, I posit the absolute and 
I myself am the absolute, but in complete identity with this I can say that 
I choose the absolute which chooses me, that I posit the absolute which 
posits me .... And what is the absolute? It is myself in my eternal validity. 
(EitherlOrII, 217-18; III, 198-99) 
In his later writings Kierkegaard qualifies the extent to which active self-realiza-
tion has an absolute character. But the primacy of the will and the necessity of a 
moral choice remain essential conditions for establishing genuine selfhood. Later 
in The Sickness Unto Death he still asserts: "The more will, the more self. A man 
who has no will at all is no self' (SUD 43-44; XV, 87). And in Training in Chris-
tianity we find the process of self-realization once again defined as a choice of one-
self (TC 159; XVI, 155). On the other side, a corrective of what would otherwise 
have remained a purely voluntaristic (and virtually atheistic) theory of self appears 
already in the "Ultimatum" at the end of Either/Or II. There we learn that not the 
ethical choice alone establishes the self "in its eternal validity", but the awareness 
of the essential inadequacy of this choice, the idea that before God "we are always 
in the wrong". This inadequacy of the ethical realm is, of course, the principal 
theme of Fear and Trembling but also, in a somewhat different version (emphasiz-
ing failure rather than moral inadequacy), of Repetition. 
II. The Eternal and the Temporal 
Having acquainted ourselves with the main source of Kierkegaard' s theory of 
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the self, we now tum to his own discussion of the synthesis of the eternal and the 
temporal. This synthesis, both in The Concept of Anxiety and in the Sickness Unto 
Death, completes the immediate synthesis of soul and body, and establishes the 
self as spirit. 
Man is a synthesis of the soulish and the bodily. But a synthesis is un-
thinkable ifthe two are not united in a third factor. This third factor is the 
spirit. (CD 39; VI, ] 37) 
I assume that "soul" in this context (in contrast to its use in Kierkegaard's "religi-
ous" works) means no more than the animating principle that has the potential to 
become spirit, but has to pass through a process of reflection in order to do so. In 
any event it is a category of immediacy. John Elrod defines it well: 
To exist soulishly determined means to exist in accord with one's natural 
and cultural immediacy. It means living according to the categories of na-
ture and culture totally devoid of an awareness of one's self as a self. But 
with the inflection of spirit, this soulish determination of the self in its nat-
ural and cultural immediacy becomes conscious of itself as real and ideal, 
is challenged by the possibility of its own freedom, and is stratified as a 
being which is in both time and eternity. 2 
The spirit, "the third factor" constitutes in fact a new synthesis- between the eter-
nal and the temporal---or, more correctly, it transforms the existing synthesis into 
a wholly different one. 
The synthesis of the eternal and the temporal is not a second synthesis but 
is the expression of the first synthesis in consequence of which man is a 
synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit. (CD 79; VI, 176) 
Nor does the dynamic opposition eternal-temporal exhaust the existential synthe-
sis. In The Sickness Unto Death other dialectical poles appear-the finite and the 
infinite, the necessary and the possible. Though their dialectical oppositions do not 
appear in The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard refers to these concepts in a manner 
wholly compatible with the later "synthesis". Since we are clearly dealing here 
with a development rather than a change, I shall assume their presence in the over-
all synthesis, and treat them (as well as the eternal-temporal) as partial "syntheses" 
even though, strictly speaking, there is only one synthesis. The question may be 
raised whether they belong to the spiritualization process proper, or whether they 
form part of the "immediate" synthesis of body and soul. I have no doubt that the 
former is the case, yet in such a manner that they remain subordinate stages which 
do not receive their definitive meaning until the synthesis of the eternal and the 
temporal has been posited. The synthesis of the eternal and the temporal differs 
from the other two: spirit is identified with one of the elements of the synthesis, the 
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eternal, while at the same time resulting from the supreme synthesis itself.3 
The synthesis of the soulish and the bodily is to be posited by the spirit, 
but spirit is the eternal, and therefore this is accomplished only when 
the spirit posits along with the former synthesis, the other synthesis of 
the temporal and the eternal. (CD 81; VI, 177) 
The eternal as such introduces a transcendent dimension, absent from the previous 
categories, that wholly transforms the existing synthesis. 
In the following pages I shall argue that the "syntheses" of the infinite and 
the possible correspond roughly to those stages of the spiritualization process to 
which Kierkegaard elsewhere refers as aesthetic and ethical, while the concluding 
one of the electoral-temporal corresponds to the religious stage. The association 
remains approximative at any moment and ceases to apply altogether once the 
lower synthesis becomes transformed by the higher one: at that point the infinite 
and the possible become convertible with the eternal. But separately from the 
eternal they belong to a lower level of reflection. In The Concept of Irony 
Kierkegaard had criticized the "infinity without finitude, an infinity void of 
content" of the German Romantics (Irony 290; I, 286). In doing so he had been 
influenced by Goethe's idea of Humanitiit which, perhaps under the impact of 
Spinoza, united the finite and the infinite as necessary complements. Kierkegaard 
opposes the "mastered" irony based upon this integrative view to the typically 
romantic irony, "the infinite absolute negativity," expression of an infinite striving 
"wherein in turns riot" (Ibid., 63; I, 84). 
When irony has been mastered in this way, when the wild infinity 
wherein it storms consumingly forth has been restrained, it does not 
follow that it should lose then its significance ... .Irony now limits, 
renders finite, defines, and thereby yields truth, actuality and content. .. 
( Irony 338; I, 328) 
In calling for a synthesis of the finite and the infinite Kierkegaard here adopts 
Hegel's schema without accepting its idealistic implications. Infinity thereby 
means not a divine predicate, but a quality of existence that allows the person 
to transcend his given situation. It is, in fact, an attribute of freedom. Wilhelm 
Anz argues that Kierkegaard has not always succeeded in limiting this subjective 
infinity and, hence, in properly distinguishing the divine and the human attribute: 
This may well be true, but should not overly concern us. For despite its idealist 
origins Kierkegaard's notion of infinity marks in fact a return to the more modest 
and mostly negative infinity of the Greeks-to ape iron-which, as Plato had 
argued, must be limited by to peras in order to constitute the real. 5 This dialectical 
moment of infinity is the work of the imagination, "the medium of the process 
of infinitizing" (SUD 163; XV, 88). It constitutes the "expanding factor" in the 
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self which enables it to move beyond the given and thereby to achieve the 
distance required for the reflection essential to the spiritualization process. But 
to the infinitizing movement must always correspond a finitizing one. The infinite, 
negative Idea "must again assert itself and render the Idea finite, make it concrete" 
(Irony, 326; 1,318). 
Yet for Kierkegaard there is still another infinity than that of the imagination 
-the inwardly infinite-which is directly related to the self's religious nature. 
In The Concept of Irony he clearly distinguished the two: 
But infinity may be either an external or an internal infinity. The person 
who would have an infinitely poetical enjoyment also has an infinity 
before him, but it is an external infinity. When I enjoy I am constantly 
outside myself in the 'other'. But such an infinity must cancel itself. 
Only if I am not outside myself in what I enjoy but in myself, only 
then is my enjoyment infinite, for it is inwardly infinite. He who enjoys 
poetically, were he to enjoy the whole world, would still lack one 
enjoyment: he does not enjoy himself. To enjoy oneself (naturally not 
in a Stoic or egotistical sense, for here again there is no true infinity, 
but in a religious sense) is alone the true infinity. (Irony 313; I, 306). 
It is this religious infinity which Kierkegaard will more and more explore in his 
subsequent works-first in the so-called "movement of infinity" by which the 
religious person resigns his claim on the temporal in Fear and Trembling. This 
movement precedes the act of faith that "by virtue of the absurd" reasserts its 
claim on the finite (Ff 79; V, 64). Unlike Socrates whose ignorance expressed 
infinite resignation, Abraham believed "and believed for this life" (Ff 34; V, 
21) "It is about the temporal, the finite, everything turns in this [faith] case" 
(Ff 60; V, 46). 
Here we detect how even the religious infinity has its dangers. For it may 
carry the religious person away from himself and his earthly task into an attitude 
of mystical indifference toward the finite. 
The God-relationship infinitizes; but this may so carry a man away that 
it becomes an inebriation, it may seem to a man as though it were 
unendurable to exist before God-for the reason that a man cannot 
return to himself, cannot become himself. (SUD 165; XV, 90) 
Hence man cannot unconditionally entrust himself even to the religious infinite, 
unless he balances his devotion by an appropriate concern for the finite. Only 
after it has become identical with the (religious) eternal allows the infinite itself 
to be unqualifiedly pursued, because then it replaces its opposition to the finite. 
by an integration with it. Nevertheless, the first, oppositional synthesis remains 
a necessary moment of reflection; without it the self would never move beyond 
the immediacy of the given. 6 
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In establishing the synthesis of the possible and the necessary the individual 
overcomes the purely aesthetic attitude in a new consciousness of freedom. Yet 
here again the temptation of the infinite awaits him, for he may reduce that free-
dom to a mere feeling of "infinite possibility". Kierkegaard, well aware of this 
danger, detaches himself from Schelling's theory of freedom which collapses the 
possible and the necessary in their "Ground". In contrast to the idealistic 
philosopher he insists on a permanent dialectical opposition between the two 
poles. Without an awareness of its restricting finitude, that is, its necessity, the 
sense of freedom turns into an empty feeling of possibility. Like the Stoic con-
sciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, it asserts its infinite potential only 
by means of a steadfast refusal of any concrete content. The polemics with Hegel, 
at their height in Philosophical Fragments, continue in The Concept of Anxiety. 
Nevertheless Kierkegaard's firm rejection of the romantic concept of freedom 
marks a return to a Hegelian synthesis of the possible and the necessary. In 
Philosophical Fragments he had posited (against Aristotle) that the possible 
excludes the necessary, since it requires an additional determination to be actual. 
The process of becoming by which the transition from the possible to the actual is 
effected has a beginning and hence lacks the inability to non-existence which 
characterizes genuine necessity. Now, in The Concept of Anxiety, he presents a 
different concept of possibility which, to be actual, requires a combination with 
necessity (Hegel's own definition). 7 
With the awareness of freedom grows the consciousness of time. For the Greeks 
freedom had not yet become the essential category of man's self-understanding. 
Theref~re they also lacked a clear sense of time. "If the Greek life might be sup-
posed to define time in any sense, it is as time past, yet without defining this by its 
relation to the present and the future" (CD 80; VI, 177). The modern sense of free-
dom places the emphasis on the future. Kierkegaard contrasts it to the ancient re-
collection as "the category by which one enters eternity forwards" (CD 80; VI, 
178). He thereby resumes the theory he had developed in Repetition: 
Just as they [the Greeks] taught that all knowledge is a recollection, so 
will modern philosophy teach that the whole of life is a repetition .... Rep-
etition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite direc-
tions; for what is recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas 
repetition properly so called is recollected forwards." (Rep. 33; V, 115) 
In such a remembrance of the past as permanent reality the consciousness of time 
remains dormant. ("The Greeks did not in the profoundest sense comprehend ... the 
temporal" (CD 78; VI, 176).) Only the orientation toward the future fully awakens 
the sense of time. 9 Faced with an empty possibility to which it must give content, 
the individual experiences dread, the fear of nothingness. Precisely in this anxious 
confrontation with the future does he become clearly aware of his temporality. An-
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xiety becomes the very face of the future. Kierkegaard wanted, above all, to estab-
lish the link between dread and time. Before writing The Concept of Anxiety he 
wrote in his diary: "It is quite possible to show that a very precise and correct usage 
of language links anxiety and the future together" (V B 55: 10; Hong I # 98). Yet 
the ultimate significance of this dread of the future consists in its projection of eter-
nity. In it the subject unconsciously longs for spiritual selfhood. The eternal 
dwells in it as in its own projected shadow. In the indeterminacy of the future the 
subject hears the voice of spiritual transcendence calling it away from the im-
mediate here-and-now and inviting it to pass from the temporal to the eternal real-
ity. This encounter with the beyond threatens man's closed existence and, hence, 
frightens him. 
In order to go to the other, we must always move through a dark and nar-
row passage. Even if it is the good [which beckons us], at first it oppresses 
us. But the moment when the passage is narrowest and the anxiety most 
intense, it will appear-while we move from the other below us the no-
thingness of which attracts us as well as frightens us, to the other above 
us, infinitely high, the absolutely other which also for the mind is a no-
thing, because of its excessive light. 10 
However, spiritual selfhood requires more than active self-realization. Active 
striving alone never comes to terms with its own ultimacy. It never confronts the 
absolute which it constantly assumes. Only in the religious attitude does the self 
achieve a conscious relation to that absolute which at once is the source offree self-
realization and transcends it. Kierkegaard identifies this transcendent element as 
the eternal. In it the self surpasses the pure succession of an ever renewed forward 
movement which constantly asserts and relativizes its existence in time. The 
realized present ever again gives way to the possible future. In its relation to the et-
ernal, however, the self attains that permanence which first fully constitutes self-
hood in time. Here existence reaches back to that original point in which, accord-
ing to Schelling, the self is "free beyond createdness and of eternal origin. "11 Even 
Kant felt the need to ground freedom in a unique deed that can be recognized only 
"through Reason independently of all conditions of time. "12 Yet neither Kant nor 
Schelling ever gave a satisfactory answer to the question how a self identical with 
the free deed can ever transcend time. How can what consists in an acting will ever 
surpass an unending (and hence time-bound) pursuit of the possible? If the eternal 
has any place in such a theory, can it be more than that of an infinite possibility? 
One commentator, perhaps more consistent than others, has accepted this conse-
quence, also for Kierkegaard. Enzo Paci writes: 
The act ... is always in time and is never the atemporal and the absolute, 
no more than it is ever the elementary, the simple, the atomic, the one. 
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Further, the 'foundation' is never a real but a possible, never a being but 
the possibility of aperture of the becoming in the future. Precisely be-
cause actuality is always temporal, spirit is possibility, freedom, rather 
than being and necessity. 13 
If the absolute is conceived as a God, existing in and by itself, the idea of a neces-
sary, fully real Being must be replaced by that of a pure possibility. Paci considers 
this conclusion implied in Kierkegaard's theory. 
Now such a closed interpretation of the self as free act hardly corresponds to 
what Kierkegaard had in mind. He was fully aware of the consequences involved 
in simply identifying selfhood with self-determination and thereby tying it to an 
unsurmountable temporality. He also took measures to avoid them. For him the ul-
timate category of selfhood is not infinite possibility, that is, indefinite openness, 
but eternity. Moreover, the category of eternity is not merely one element of a con-
cluding synthesis, unlike the possible which appears as only one of the dialectical 
poles of a synthesis. The relation to the eternal which concludes the constitution of 
selfhood has no dialectical counterpart. But since this relation also penetrates all 
other, temporal aspects ofthe self the eternal must, in addition, establish a bipolar 
synthesis with the temporal. Without this final synthesis the eternal would simply 
abolish the temporal and suppress the entire process of free self-realization. Hence 
the eternal, though clearly transcending the temporal, must also relate to it. It 
could not enter the existing synthesis without inserting itself into it as one of two 
elements of a new synthesis. But it is the eternal alone which determines the self as 
spirit. Kierkegaard perceived the uniqueness of "the eternal", where Schelling, 
steeped in the romantic use (and abuse!) of religious language, had failed to grasp 
fully the distinctness of the eternal from the infinitely possible. To be sure, Kier-
kegaard's solution presents some problems of its own. Can a self defined as free-
dom still remain open to the eternal? Does the eternal not conflict with time? Is the 
relativity of actions accomplished in time through which man achieves his self-
hood compatible with a relation to an absolute beyond time? Kierkegaard himself 
once raised the question: "Can the eternal be decided in time?" (XI,A329). To an-
swer it we must first clarify the concept of time itself. 
III. The Instant 
Thus far we assumed that the self-actualization of freedom entails a complete 
concept oftime, if not of eternity. Butthis is far from being the case. Being primar-
ily future-directed the experience of duration implied in free self-actualization 
lacks the element of permanence needed to retain the past and to anticipate the fu-
ture in the present. Its constant forward movement, no more than the ancient recol-
lection, yields the sense of present that characterizes a complete experience of 
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time. Only with the relation to the eternal does time reach its fullness (II, A 437 
(1839». When the Eternal entered the temporal at the moment of the Incarnation it 
transformed our time consciousness. 
The concept around which everything turns in Christianity, the concept 
which makes all things new, is the fullness of time, is the instant as eter-
nity, and yet this eternity is at once the future and the past. (CD 81; VI, 
178) 
To be sure, there always had to be some element of everlastingness, and hence at 
least an inkling of eternity in duration, for that is the very condition of conscious-
ness in general and of time-consciousness in particular. 
When time is correctly defined as infinite succession, it seems plausible 
to define it also as the present, the past and future. However, this distinc-
tion is incorrect, if one means by it that this is implied in time itself; for it 
first emerges with the relation oftime to eternity and the reflection of eter-
nity in it. (CD 76; VI, 1974) 
In that general sense all time consciousness implies a notion of permanence. But 
unless it be interpreted as an intersection of time by eternity, this permanent ele-
ment tends to be repelled to the past or propelled into the future. The Greek eternity 
lies behind, as the past "into which one enters only backwards" (CD 80; VI, 177). 
As Kierkegaard has explained in Philosophical Fragments (published in the same 
year as Anxiety), Socratic recollection meant more than reminiscing historical 
events: the recollected past grounds my present existence. Nevertheless, even 
though recollection transcends the past as mere past, it attains the eternal only in a 
temporal image which lacks the necessary nature of true eternity. Whatever comes 
into existence may be immutable once it exists, but it does not thereby become et-
ernal. The immutability of the past annihilates the merely possible by becoming ir-
reversible and thus excluding possible alternatives, but it never attains the intrinsic 
necessity of the eternal. In an early diary entry Kierkegaard notes how, by a 
strange dialectic, the concentration on the past may tum into an expectation of the 
future, as in the Jewish mind (II, A372)-a precocious version of the exegetical 
principle, Urzeit ist Endzeit. 
The nature of the eternal implied in the ancient recollection may remain a matter 
of debate. But about the nature of its presence in the "modem" mind there can be 
no doubt. The indefinite future which receives all the emphasis contains unques-
tionably an image of eternity. Yet the eternal here appears only "incognito", that 
is, without a real present. The "present" merely functions as a dividing line be-
tween a closed past and an open future, without real content of its own. "If the in-
stant is posited ... merely as a discrimen, then the future is the eternal" (CD 81; VI, 
178). The subject remains in a dreaming state toward a spiritual existence which it 
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conceives only as substanceless project. "The eternal must not be understood 
merely as a denominator of transitus but also as a continuous state of fulfillment" 
(U, A570). 
In contrast to the Greeks and the "modems" Christianity presents the eternal as 
distinct from the temporal. "Christianity continually speaks about eternity, con-
stantly thinks about the eternal" (X3 A286 (1950». It is true that Kierkegaard also 
attributes to it a preoccupation with the future, with "post-existence" as opposed to 
the pre-existence or even the concern with the immediate present of the Greeks 
(VIllI A 147 (1847». In Repetition he simply states that eternity for the Christian 
lies in the future, and in Works of Love he surprisingly denies that the contact be-
tween the eternal and the temporal occurs in the present, for reasons not unlike 
those used by the theologians of hope, namely, that the present itself would then be 
the eternal (which it obviously is not). 
If the eternal is in the temporal it is in the future (for the present cannot get 
hold of it, and the past is indeed past) or in possibility. The past is actual-
ity; the future is possibility. Eternally the eternal is the eternal; in time the 
eternal is possibility, the future. Therefore we call tomorrow the future, 
but we also call eternal life the future. (Works of Love, 234; XII, 240) 
The emphasis on the future is justified insofar as Christianity first conceived of 
eternity as that endless openness which only the future possesses. In fact, the same 
idea lies at the origin of what Kierkegaard refers to as "the modem" attitude-how-
ever far it may since have removed itself from the Christian view. But unless one 
relates these statements about the eternal as future to the more fundamental em-
phasis on the present as the meeting point oftime and eternity, they distort the per-
spective of Kierkegaard's theory. In an early Edifying Discourse he explicitly de-
fined the relation to the future as a subordinate one: "Through the eternal can one 
conquer the future, because the eternal is the foundation of the future" (Ed. Disc. 
1,21). 
The eternal is the "fullness of time" (II, A437) that allows the present to incorpo-
rate past and future into its own everlastingness. As Kierkegaard formulates it in a 
Christian Discourse: 
When by the help of eternity a man lives absorbed in today, he turns his 
back upon the next day, so that he does not see it at all. If he turns around, 
eternity is confused before his eyes, it becomes the next day. But if for the 
sake of labouring more effectually towards the goal (eternity) he turns his 
back, he does not see the next day at all, whereas by the help of eternity he 
sees quite clearly today and its task .... Faith turns its back to the eternal in 
order precisely to have this [the eternal] with him today. But if a man 
turns, especially with earthly passion, towards the future, then he is farth-
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est from the eternal.. .. (Christian Discourses, 76-77; XIII, 74) 
In this passage we have the whole complex dialectic of the present and the future 
with respect to the eternal in Christianity. The eternal lies indeed, also in the fu-
ture, but it can be attained only through an intensive consciousness of the present. 
It becomes most manifest in the lasting presentness which man experiences at the 
privileged moments of his existence. Thus joy consists in being fully present to 
oneself, in truly "being today". "Joy is the present tense with the whole emphasis 
upon the present. Therefore it is that God is blessed who eternally says Today" 
(The Lilies of the Field in Christian Disc. 350; XIV, 160). 
To the present-less time consciousness of the Greeks and the modems Kier-
kegaard opposes the Christian awareness of the "instant", the point where time en-
counters the eternal. 
The life which is in time and is merely that of time has no present. It is true 
that to characterize the sensuous life it is commonly said that it is ' in the 
instant' and only in the instant. The instant is here understood as some-
thing abstracted from the eternal, and if this is to be accounted from the 
present, it is a parody of it. The present is the eternal, or rather the eternal 
is the present, and the present is full. (CD 77-78; VI, 175) 
The instant, perhaps Kierkegaard's most original category, has nothing in com-
mon with the mathematical abstraction that divides a homogeneous line into past 
and future. In such a spatial representation no single moment has any particular 
significance. Nor does eternity consist in the infinite extension of such abstract 
"instants". "Eternity .. .is the opposite to the temporal as a whole" (Christian Disc. 
103-04; XIII, 98). At the same time only the eternal introduces a full awareness of 
time, thus positing both itself and its opposite: "eternity [is] constantly permeating 
time" (CD 80; VI, 177). This dual nature gives the eternal an ambiguous character. 
Viewed from time the instant passes from the past into the future; viewed from 
eternity it knows neither past nor future or, more correctly, it transforms past and 
future into a lasting present. Being an "atom of eternity" (CD 79; VI, 176) the in-
stant restructures the entire synthesis of selfhood into a spiritual one. "No sooneris 
the spirit posited than the instant is there" (CD 79: VI, 177). 
Only with the breakthrough of the eternal is the final synthesis of the self ac-
complished, the one that relates temporality as a whole to its opposite. "The syn-
thesis of the soulish and the bodily .. .is accomplished only when the spirit projects 
at the same time along with this the second synthesis of the eternal and the tem-
poral" (CD 81; VI, 178). To be sure, temporality was present from the beginning 
and hence also an implicit consciousness of eternity. But once the eternal becomes 
conscious in its opposition to time it entirely transforms the relation between pre-
sent, past and future. Through the eternal the present is posited "as the annulled 
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succession" (CD 77; VI, 175). The instant preserves the past and holds the spiritual 
essence of the future. Yet it fonns no "eternal return", no mere repetition of the 
past in the future. It contains the pastas past, in its unique and irreversible identity, 
and the future as anticipated, as what-is-yet-to-come and has never been. Far from 
abolishing history the instant gives it an unprecedented importance: the moment of 
the objective presence of the eternal in time divides history into AD and Be. Yet it 
overcomes the purely successive character of history. In the timeless instant all 
times and events acquire a lasting presence. In our age poets have expressed the 
same idea in different modes. Thus Claudel writes: 
Rien n' a pu ou ne peut 
Etre qui ne soit a ce moment meme; toutes 
Choses sont presentes pour moi (La ville). 
And T. S. Eliot: 
Or say that the end precedes the beginning, 
And the end and the beginning were always there 
Before the beginning and after the end 
And all is always now. ("Burnt Norton" in Four Quartets). 
Thus "recollection" assumes a new meaning in the Christian context. Rather than 
denying history it interiorizes time and thereby overcomes the distention of time 
through time. 
Kierkegaard warns against a too easy "etemalization" of time or of any of its mo-
ments. Writing against Martensen and other Hegelians he ridicules the idea of at-
taching to each moment an eternal significance in its own right. This, in fact, 
amounts to a simple divinization of time, which in the end abolishes the genuinely 
temporal. True eternity always retains a certain resistance to time, however much 
it penneates it. Hence the birth of a new opposition (the eternal-the temporal) 
once the eternal enters the soul-body synthesis. To treat each moment as if it were 
itself "immortal" (as, according to Kierkegaard, "metaphysics" does) reduces the 
eternalization of time to a "comic" level. The Christian concept of immortality 
evaluates time more realistically: 
Even though Christianity teaches that at the Day of Judgment a man must 
give account of every idle word he has spoken, which we understand sim-
ply as a total recollection, ... and even though the doctrine of Christianity 
cannot be more sharply illuminated by any contrast than it is by the Greek 
conception that the immortal souls frrst drank of Lethe in order to forget, 
yet it does not by any means follow that recollection must either directly 
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or indirectly become comic, directly by the fact that one remembers 
ludicrous incidents, indirectly by transforming ludicrous incidents into 
essential decisions. (CD 136-37; VI, 233) 
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Here the eternal clearly preserves an identity that never coincides with time or with 
any of its moments. Only in immortal life, that is, in existence after death, can eter-
nity fully assert itself in the human spirit and this essential reality "will have the ef-
fect of the water of Lethe so far as concerns the unessential" (CD 137; VI, 233). 
Kierkegaard's equation of pure eternity with immortality creates, however, seri-
ous problems. How can existence-in-time ever become fully "eternal"? The idea of 
immortality, constantly assumed, never received an adequate treatment in his 
work. 
The difference between an existence locked in a closed temporality and one that 
has opened up to the eternal appears in the subject's attitude toward his own poten-
tial, and particularly in the concomitant feeling of anxiety. Each ascent to a more 
spiritual level of selfhood requires a leap into the unknown which provokes anxi-
ety. Even the dormant awareness of possible selfhood that hides in the immediate 
harmony of soul and body elicits an unfocused dread. Such was the "profound sor-
row unexplained" (CD 58: VI, 156) that clouded the ancient mind, an "anxiety be-
fore its own absence of anxiety". 14 Similarly Kierkegaard describes man's condi-
tion before the Fall as anxious, even though neither a clear consciousness of free-
dom nor of eternity existed. Anxiety intensifies once freedom becomes fully con-
scious and the individual faces the gaping emptiness of his own fateful potential. 
Christianity alleviates this dread before the future. The believer no longer realizes 
his freedom in a vacuum of sheer possibility, but in a present that preserves a re-
deemed past and maintains a continuity with the future. Not the mere nothingness 
of infinite possibility confronts the Christian, but the transcendent power to recap-
ture (Gjentage[se-"repetition"), ever again, a freedom disrupted through fate or 
sin. Meanwhile faith introduces its own anxiety. Once sinfulness has been re-
vealed, the ability to commit moral evil takes on a concrete character unknown to 
the dreaming apprehension of the prelapsarian or pagan mind. The more the indi-
vidual becomes aware of his relation to the eternal, the more he realizes his omin-
ous power to sever that relation. Next to this dread before his power of evil the per-
son who has confronted the eternal also experiences another, demoniacal fear of 
the good, the fear of admitting the eternal into his existence in time. If he yields to 
it, dread will tum into despair (as described in Sickness Unto Death). 
The lesser or greater presence of the eternal determines the attitudes toward de-
spair. The aesthetic attitude knows only an implicit despair, the refusal to let the 
spirit break through which Kierkegaard described in the behavior of a Nero 
(Either/Or II), or even of a young woman who dismisses the serious choices of life 
(Sickness Unto Death). The ethical attitude is perfectly capable of despair about 
the self as self-realizing project, but not of that ultimate refusal to be oneself in 
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one's relation to the eternal. Only in a clear consciousness of the eternal can man 
fully choose closed finitude, fatalistic resignation, deliberate escape into a world 
of fantasy or exclusive reliance on his own potential. The possibility of despair 
presupposes a clear awareness of that full responsibility of existing in time which 
man receives only in the light of eternity. 
Comparing now the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal with the other two 
syntheses we notice that the former both transcends and transforms the latter. In 
contrast to the balance between the finite and the infinite, between the necessary 
and the possible, the final synthesis results in a clear priority of one term (the eter-
nal) over the other. The eternal, once it appears, transcends both its own synthesis 
(with time) and the two others. As the principle that orders and structures the whole 
the eternal has no parallel. Indeed, it distorts the existing harmony in an upward di-
rection. The synthesis with the eternal is lopsided from the start: the temporal owes 
its own content to its opposite, and the eternal preserves its transcendence even 
after having posited its temporal counterpart. This unbalance also affects the other 
constituents of the selfhood. The presence of spirit conveys a different dimension 
to the finite and the infinite than they had in the aesthetic or in the ethical attitudes. 
In a religious perspective the infinite becomes an attribute of the eternal, fully ex-
changeable with it. If he fails to keep this semantic shift in mind Kierkegaard's 
reader will object to the confusion of a term that signifies at once the realm of pure 
fantasy, unlimited human possibility, and the very nature of God. A similar trans-
formation occurs in the possible. On a purely ethical level the possible consists in 
that open-ended freedom which draws the individual beyond the circle of his given 
reality. It tempts him to the hazardous projects and fantastic schemes against 
which Sickness Unto Death warned. But elsewhere the possible becomes 
synonymous with the eternal in man. Thus in The Works of Love: 
The possibility of the good is more than possibility, for it is the eternal. 
This is the basis of the fact that one who hopes can never be deceived, for 
to hope is to expect the possibility of the good; but the possibility of the 
good is the eternal. (Works of Love 234; XII, 240) 
And further: 
But if there is less love in him, there is also less of the eternal in him; but 
if there is less of the eternal in him, there is also less possibility, less 
awareness of possibility (for possibility appears through the temporal 
movement of the eternal within the eternal in a human being ... ). (Ibid., 
241; XII, 248) 
In Fear and Trembling and Repetition Kierkegaard describes faith as the opening 
up of possibility. Even when fate appears to have closed off all avenues to an ac-
ceptable future, the knight of faith can still hope- and hope for this life-in virtue 
OF TIME AND ETERNITY 175 
of the eternal. The coming of the eternal in time constitutes the ultimate possibil-
ity, for "with God nothing is impossible". 
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